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ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: ENVIRONMENTAL PRESSURES
THE MILITARY SETTING, AND THE ULTIMATE TEST
ABSTRACT
Many on-going actions are in progress to maintain an
effective military establishment. One such action has been
in the area of Organizational Development (OD) . The three
major services, the Air Force, Navy, and. Army have generated
programs v/hich, in theory employ the technology of Organi-
zational Development „ The goals of these OD efforts all
purport to improve organizational functioning in the areas of
efficiency, effectiveness, and in total combat readiness.
These military OD programs are in various stages of insti-
tutionalization. Because of their growing size and influence,
it is felt to be an appropriate time to evaluate their use-
fulness. The ultimate test for the effectiveness of a mili-
tary unit is, of course, under combat conditions. Unfortu-
nately, there is little precedent to say that OD in the
military is good or bad under the stress of combat . This
thesis provides a context for looking at OD in the military
by analyzing the environmental pressures, the current OD
effort, and considers the use of OD under combat conditions.
It identifies the likely benefits, the potential dangers of
using such a change approach, and makes recommendations on
how to accomplish the goal of improving organizational
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The United States Department of Defense is presently
investing 53 million dollars a year in pay for its human
resources [Ref. 9» P- xi]. In addition, the separate
military services have initiated costly programs which
have been implemented under the rubric of Organizational
Development (OD) . A possibility does exist that the sub-
stantial investment in these programs will be lost because
these programs v/ill be abandoned in the event of war. This
thesis will present an argument that these programs are
beneficial in their present state but that their greatest
potential value can best be realized by projecting and
planning for their use under combat conditions,
Military OD programs, as they presently exist, are
oriented toward improving organizational functioning by
concentrating on the interpersonal and group dynamics of
their individual members. This process is time consuming
and may be a severe constraint under combat conditions.
However, OD consultants can still serve a useful purpose in
combat by assisting the organization in processing the infor-
mation so uniquely different in combat. This thesis reviews
the publication of several eminent sociologists, briefly
covers the separate military services OD programs, and

attempts to go beyond the past and the present and predict
what OD programs, practices, and techniques might be
employed under the dynamic conditions of combat,
B. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE MILITARY SERVICE
Organizational Development has been a popular name in
the civilian world for several years. OD has become a
field in its own right developed through contributions
from the disciplines of psychology, sociology, business
administration, philosophy, political science, and other
recognized approaches [Ref, 20, p. 15]. Some theorists
consider it to be a logical expansion of neoclassical
organizational theory (the human relations movement). This
is typified by Hicks who writes: "For the first time
industrial organizations were recognized as not merely
economic systems but also social ones with important
internal social dynamics [Ref. 20, p. 20^-].
The human relations approach has now been applied in
business and industrial settings for several decades.
Whether OD is an extension of human relations or is now
a separate discipline is a moot argument and is of little
importance when defending OD as a method of improving an
organization. Perhaps OD's greatest contribution to
organizational thought is that it takes the different
management philosophies out of a normative, theoretical
setting and puts these management philosophies into a
practical setting. The organization development process

allows constructive change to take place through the indi-
viduals who comprise the organization.
In reality, organizational change accomplished through
an OD program may have modified few organizational functions.
Nonetheless it is often perceived by the individuals within
an organization as an activity which has made the climate
and interpersonal relationships better. The whole OD pro-
cess is typically complicated and time consuming. Adequate
evidence does exist to indicate that OD does improve orga-
nizational functioning by focusing attention on how a group
works together and "... what else is going on as the task
is being worked on"[Ref. 15, p. 101]. This process
improves morale, motivation, productivity, and the organi-
zational climate
.
In the military, this is precisely what OD is trying to
accomplish: to improve organizational functioning by con-
centrating on improving the individuals and group processes
within an organization. Additionally, OD recognizes the
simple fact that it is people who make organizational
systems work no matter how complicated or automated their
product or service may be, However, several hundred years
of tradition seem to indicate that the modus operandi of
any military service is beset with autocratic and bureau-
cratic mechanisms which are dsyfunctional in terms of
personal motivation and achievement. Today, the military
services are attempting to change their image because this is




The "basic premises of this thesis are that (1) social
change is inevitable and (2) that the separate military
services have traditionally been resistant to any change
that is accomplished too quickly. A fundamental question
is why should there be any change at all in the military?
After all in the view of many persons, the United States
has never officially lost a war or succumbed to an enemy
under unfavorable terms. Additionally, US military forces
have been historically effective in carrying out their
assigned defense mission. If the services are effective,
why should they change?
One rationale in support of the need for change is to
maintain the military as a representative social institu-
tion. In this view society has representative values and
these social values should be reflected in the military.
The national society is the usual source of the military's
most valuable asset—its people. A subtle example of
military values being incongruous with civilian values
would be the recent attempts to unionize the armed forces.
Trade unionism is an accepted part of our larger society.
An example of the contrast between societal and military
values in collision is seen in the military's dread of even
discussing military unions.
C. SUMMARY
Virtually all the major military services of the United
States have instituted programs which purport to improve
11

organizational effectiveness and efficiency. These pro-
grams have been viewed as successful in varying degrees.
What has been the cost of their successes? Let's question
the basis for these programs by first recognizing two very
important constraints. First is the advent of the all-
volunteer force. Secondly, the decreasing numbers of eli-
gible males that constitute the military resource pool
dictates that some changes will be required to sustain the
required personnel strength of the military of the future.
Improving organizational functioning is the stated goal of
military organizational development programs. The author
contends, however, that these programs are primarily an
attempt to bring military values into line with society's
values while recognizing various operable constraints.
The degree of success of these OD programs will help deter-
mine whether the military services will be able to maintain
the required quantity and quality of their personnel,
Desired personnel levels must be achieved within the all-
volunteer framework without returning to a conscription
system or the services being forced into a disadvantageous




II. REVIEW OF THOSE DISCIPLINES WHOSE THEORIES
CONTRIBUTE TO UNDERSTANDING
ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS IN COMBAT
A . OVERVIEW
Organizational Development literature dealing specifi-
cally with the military environment is scanty at "best in
comparison with the increasing number of publications which
are oriented toward the civilian environment. Military
publications, in the form of papers, articles, and reports
predominately deal with the integration of OD theory into
the military setting. A principal limitation is that these
publications fall short of dealing with the more dynamic
implications of Organizational Development in a combat
environment. To develop a proper climate to analyze the
problem of OD in combat, three distinctly separate areas
were researched. These areas or disciplines which form the
basis of this thesis are: Sociology, Military History,
and Organizational Development , In addition to the three
disciplines listed, an attempt is made to integrate the
results of research published in technical reports, pri-
marily from the fields of economics and social psychology,
to assist decision makers in policy formulation and imple-




The writings of Charles Moskos, Morris Janowitz,
and Samuel Stouffer and others were used to help define the
US military in the context of a total society. The impact
of their research and publications is paramount because they
are able to describe both the civilian and the military
communities, the similarities, the dissimilarities, and
most importantly the consequences of continuing the diver-
gent trends of each entity- The findings and predictions
of military sociologists are not limited to the present.
The historical framework of this thesis concentrates on the
past thirty-five years and includes sociological studies of
World War II, the Korean War, and to a limited degree, the
war in Vietnam. Several recurrent themes continue to emerge.
First, without a conscription system, the US military does
not proportionally represent the racial and class distinc-
tions of the American society in general. Secondly, the
military institution, no matter what the social make-up,
markedly contrasts with civilian structures and values.
Lastly, because of the sheer differences in numbers, the
military institution should adjust to society's values in
general rather than vice versa.
The author feels that special contributions came from
Morris Janowitz' s The Professional Soldier , Sociology and
The Military Environment
, and The US Forces and the Zero
Draft ; Charles Moskos 's The American Enlisted Man , and
"The Emergent Military: Civil, Traditional, or Plural?";





Extensive readings in military history were under-
taken in support of this thesis in an attempt to discover
whether individual values and attitudes toward war have
changed over time The primary research in this area was
oriented toward the writings of S . L. A. Marshall, John
2
Keegan, and J. Glenn Gray, These three authors were selected
because their writings go beyond the terrain, tactics,
weather, weapons, and the logistics and deal with the indi-
vidual's fear, feelings, and frustrations of being closely
engaged with an enemy. S. L. A. Marshall is a noted
American military historian and his writings include World
War II, Korea, and Vietnam* It is interesting to note that
the tactical nature of each of these wars is significantly
different; however, the personal dynamics of the individual
participants is remarkably consistent. Among these consis-
tencies, allegiance to the preservation of self and peers
takes precedence over mission accomplishment and organiza-
tional survival in the combat environment. The challenge,
in an OD framework, is how can the individual values and
2 Special contributions came from S. L. A. Marshall's
Battle at Best , The Military History of the Korean War
,
Ambush
, and Battles in the Monsoon ; John Keegan ' s The Face
of Battle ; and J. Glenn Gray's The Warriors : Reflections
on Men in Battle.
15

group processes be improved and integrated into an environ-
ment where individual, group, and organizational norms and
goals are all consistent.
3. Contributions from Economics and Social Psychology
Department of Defense and other government agencies
spend millions of dollars annually for research conducted
by civilian corporations and educational institutions.
This research is normally published in the form of technical
reports but is usually oriented toward specific issues such
as cost or other variables which effect the military, Most
technical reports attempt to quantify costs of alternatives
but rarely analyze these alternatives in the framework of
how other variables might be effected. Fairly extensive
reference will be made to the findings of these reports
in this thesis because they are usually more current,
usually are quantifiable, and represent the latest methods
in research using many different academic disciplines and
computer modeling. While there is some effort to provide
widest dissemination, these technical reports rarely are
used outside of the proponent agency sponsoring the research,
^. Organizational Development
In the past several years, numerous articles and
textbooks have been published by OD theorists and practi-
tioners. While these writings are fairly extensive, an
universally agreed model or theory has not emerged. OD is
16

multi-facited in that it deals with an organization's pro-
blems from an individual, team, intergroup, or total orga-
nization level. This thesis will present several situations
in which the combat environment is significantly different
from an environment where little danger is present. These
situations will be diagnosed in terms of what is the needed
change, and how it could be accomplished using OD approaches,
techniques, and consultants.
5. Summary
There is no doubt the integrating of military soci-
ology, military history, economic and physical constraints,
and Organizational Development is a rather ambitious under-
taking„ This thesis does not intend to be all-inclusive
but rather is an attempt to show that all of these variables
have a significant impact on the future of the US military.
The military OD programs are presently oriented toward a
stable, stateside, and static environment. This thesis
suggests that their greatest potential could be measured
in human lives saved in combat.
B. MILITARY SOCIOLOGY
Many academic disciplines attempt to explain or increase
understanding of organizations and individuals within an
organization. Sociology is certainly no exception,, The
normative and descriptive nature of sociological writings
contribute to the increased understanding of mankind and
17

our relationship with our environment. However, these
writings are primarily historically oriented. This his-
torical orientation, while usually sound, does not provide
for accurate predictions about man and his relationship
with the society in the future. Individual values change
and societal values are constantly changing but usually at
a very slow rate.
Sociologists frequently are tasked with analyzing pro-
bable future events or alternatives which impact on changes
being considered in the present , This extrapolation of
the future causes sociological analysis to be principally
subjective o The analysis is usually based on an underlying
set of static assumptions. "The social scientist sees the
professional soldier as dogmatic. As a result, the approach
of the social scientist to the military establishment has
been segmental and technical, rather than comprehensive
and scientific" [Ref. 2k, p. 31].
The analysis is further compounded because individual
reactions change as the number of different races, reli-
gions, nationalities change. The result of this complex
change process is the lack of a universally applied model
which can be used to understand all mankind. Perhaps this
lack of agreement serves a useful purpose. Sociological
research is typically an attempt to place events and
conditions in a conceptual framework which is reflective
of the social variable being investigated. The trend in
sociological analysis is to address issues which can be under-




Despite the resistance toward concentrating on small
elements within our society, military sociology has emerged
as a separate discipline within sociology [Ref. 26, p. 9]
•
The reasons are beginning to become obvious. First, there
is an increasing analytical trend toward evaluating human
variables and their effect on organizational functioning.
The US military is beginning to integrate human factors
into their planning and to study various types of organi-
zational structures. Second, research methodology is
becoming sophisticated where these variables under study can
be better quantified. This new found sophistication pro-
vides a degree of acceptance to research findings formerly
lacking within the scientific community. These findings
are now becoming increasingly objective rather than subjec-
tive in their basic character-
A review of the literature of military sociology reveals
what appears to be very explicit and accurate reporting of
human factors which affect the US military. For example,
the following findings were reported by Samuel Stouffer,
et al:
The Army was a new world for most civilian
soldiers. Of its many contrasts with civilian
institutions, three may be cited:
1. Its authoritarian organization,
demanding rigid obedience,
2. Its highly stratified social system,
in which hierarchies of difference were
formally and minutely established by
official regulation, subject to penalties
for infraction on and off duty.
3. Its emphasis on traditional ways of
doing things and its discouragement of
initiative [Ref, k2, p. 55]>
19

Stouffer further reports on how the soldier viev/ed these
authoritarian methods:
1. That many of those exercising authority were
unqualified for their job.
2. That the soldier did not get enough chance
to learn the "reason why" of orders.
3. That authority was exercised as if those
in authority assumed a very low level of intel-
ligence on the part of trainees [Ref. 4-2, p. 65~],
What is interesting about the above reported findings is
that they were published in 19^9 • Ironically, it is likely
that many personnel still serving on active duty along with
those who have been discharged would say that the above
conditions still exist in the military services today.
Whether this is actually true or not is of little practical
significance because it is perceived by a large segment of
the population as being true. One possible implication is
that there has been little or no change in the popular
perception of the military during the past thirty years.
One likely reason for this lack of change is the deeply
ingrained bureaucratic system. This bureaucratic orientation,
coupled with a mandatory service obligation have combined
to foster the static perception of the military. Mere
entry and the first act of oath of enlistment have often
meant adaption to a distinctly different set of values.
These two factors have also initiated a primary sense of
allegiance to military authority. Only the federal consti-
tution takes precedence over the authority of the military
orders which serve to make the system work.
20

Another prime reason why changes have not taken place
within the military is reported by Stouffer. His findings
suggest that any changes to the use of principally authori-
tarian methods of compliance were not rewarded. Lastly,
the military system is considered to be too large to be
effected by any change such as a modification of the
authority subsystem. The military organizational structure
is essentially monolithic and bureaucratic. There is pro-
bably not going to be any rapid changes in the size and
structure of the military which would alleviate the per-
ceptions of the exercising of authority and the stultifying
of innovativeness
.
"The US moves to an all-volunteer force in the context
of the most extensive anti-military sentiment in its recent
history" [Ref. 23, p. &]. Conscription is lost to us as
an alternative. It appears that when the social cost to
obtain the required quantity of personnel to support the
required manning level becomes excessive, the military
services need to start looking for alternative ways of
operating internally. It is this internal pressure for
change which should work toward altering the current deroga-
tory impressions into positive impressions of the military
environment. The efforts to change internally seem thus
far to have been given only taken attention. However, the
lack of internal change is beginning to be felt in terms
of the quantity and quality of service manpower, This,
quite simply, is a clear example of the clash between the
21

expectations of the military and its larger society. This
military personnel situation is beginning to effect vir-
tually all non-communist nations under advanced indus-
trialism.
. . . internally, the advanced industrial societies
without totalitarian social control systems, higher
levels of education and a more ample standard of
mass consumption have led wide segments of the
population to a diffuse but persistent reluctance
to serve in the military. . „ . Those who can
be impressed into military service because of
sheer poverty are fewer in number and marginal
persons have the alternative benefits of the wel-
fare state. Thus the introduction of an all-
volunteer force does not solve the problems of
military manpower, but rather under an all-volun-
teer force the number, quality, and profession-
alism of the military emerge as critical and
persistent issues of national security [Ref, 23,
p. *K5].
The all-volunteer force in the US military has been in
existence since fiscal year 197^ when conscription under
the Selective Service Act was terminated. Since its incep-
tion, all the military services have had to adjust to a
more competitive manpower availability situation. As
quoted earlier, our defense manpower costs for 1977 were
calculated at almost 53 billion dollars. Inflation,
increased competition for scarce manpower caused by the
ending of the draft, and a steadily decreasing supply of
prime recruiting candidates, are projected to cause man-
power costs to reach 61 billion dollars by 1985. In addi-
tion, the shortfall of available manpower is predicted to
be 88,000 personnel (assuming low unemployment) or 53 > 000
personnel (assuming high unemployment) [Ref. 9, xi-xxiii].
22

A parallel can be drawn to this situation in 1985 with
the present use of illegal aliens in US industry in 1978
»
Approximately 8 million illegal aliens are currently employed
in American industry. However, the bulk of these alien
workers are concentrated in the extreme lower end of the
income scale. There is a market for illegal aliens because
welfare for US citizens is a better economic alternative
than being employed doing menial labor [Ref„ ^6, p. 80-81],
This situation, while apparently somewhat remote, is an
extension of the sociological argument that the all-volunteer
force increases the probability that enlisted ranks will be
overrepresented by black and Spanish speaking elements
[Ref. 23, p. 9].
Military sociologists frequently make reference to the
constant state of change in organizations and organizational
structures caused by the dynamic use of technological weapon
systems. "While the interest in the human problems of new
weapons is mainly physiological, it will ultimately be
necessary to discover and re-discover the social elements
in these weapons systems" [Ref, Zk, p. 113] • "While new
machines are likely to be better than old ones, constantly
disrupted organizations are not necessarily more conducive
to satisfactory primary group relations" [Ref, 2h
,
p. 98].
The key result from these frequent organizational
changes on the primary group relationship is a growing
frustration. The increasingly technical nature of new
weapons systems has brought about a shift in the occupational
23

distribution of enlisted positions. Table 1 presents a
percentage distribution of changes that have occurred during
the period 19^5 to 1967° The implications for organiza-
tional theorists and organizational development practi-
tioners in the future will be the man-machine relationship
3
as well as the primary group relationships,
Charles Moskos in his article, "The Emergent Military,"
presents an excellent summary of the all-volunteer force
and the social conditions which will impact on the US
military.
. . . the decline in status of the American military
establishment may well be a part of a more perva-
sive pattern occurring through Western parliamentary
democracies. Observers in contemporary armed
forces in Western Europe, the United Kingdom,
Canada, and Australia have all noted the sharp
depreciation in the military's standing in
these societies . . . . In other words, the
American military, and its counterparts in other
Western post industrialized societies, is experi-
encing a historical turning point with regard to
its societal legitimacy and public acceptance [Ref
.
35, p. 260].
The decline in social status is not the only significant
variable which effects the all-volunteer force. "One of
the most telling arguments against the establishment of an
3
-' Credit for this theme is given to Moshe Davidowitz
who conducted a Futuristics workshop at the Fall 1977 0D
Network in San Diego, California,, The basis for the man-
machine relationship is found in an educational setting
where the student has a personal interaction with a com-
puter using computer assisted learning. The computer and
student have a first name relationship. Research indicated
that the computer-student relationship is as strong as or




OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ENLISTED POSITIONS,
SELECTED YEARS 1945-196?
Percent Dis tribution
Occupation Group 19^5 1953 1963 1967
Ground Combat 24.1 17»3 14.1 14 ,1
Electronics 5.8 9»5 14.2 14.-7
Other Technical 7.2 7*3 8.1 7.7
Administrative and Cleri cal 15o3 20.6 19.9 18,4




Craftsmen 9»2 6.6 7.2 6.8
Services I606 15»4 11.9 12.0
Miscellaneous 1.9 — -- —
Total S/ 100o0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a/ Rounded to 100.0 percent
Sources: Sheldon E. Haber, "Occupational Structure in the
Military and Civilian Sectors of the Economy,"
Technical Report No. TR-1224, Graduate School of




all-volunteer force is that such a force will have an
enlisted membership overwhelmingly black and poor" [Ref , 35 >
p. 262]. The enlisted ranks do not represent educational
levels and intelligence levels which represent the general
population,
(a) non-high school graduates suffer a financial
loss if they choose civilian employment over con-
tinued military service;
(b) enlisted men who have attended college experi-
ence a financial loss if they remain in military
service;
(c) military and civilian earnings for high school
graduates are roughly the same; and
(d) military earnings for blacks with a high
school education or less will far exceed their
earnings in the civilian labor force.
In other words, on the assumption that social
groups will generally behave in their own econo-
mic self-interest, an all volunteer force would
significantly overdraw its membership from the
less-educated and minority groups of American
society [Ref. 35, p. 263].
This represents one of the most glaring inconsistencies
of the all-volunteer force. Technology requires increas-
ingly higher levels of mental capabilities yet, any level
of military training beyond basic skills apparently only
accelerates the rate at which military personnel return to
the civilian work force.
The US Navy/ Army, and Air Force have organizational
development programs. These programs while significantly
different between the services, are all in varying stages
of institutionalization. Institutionalization implies
that their separate programs are normative and thus are
applicable to all sub-organizations within each service.
Yet, a comparison of civilian and military values reveals
26

there are many facets of both societal segments that are
convergent, divergent, and pluralistic. Military and
civilian structures seem to have been converging because of:
(1) increased reliance on civilian skills to develop and
maintain sophisticated weapon systems; (2) identical mana-
gerial skills; (3) greater consistency in youth values; and
(^) life styles becoming increasingly oriented toward
leisure.
Conversely, military and civilian structures are diver-
gent and traditional because of: (1) increasing number
of officers trained and educated in military academies;
(2) decreasing number of upper and middle class in the
enlisted ranks caused by the ending of the draft; (3) the
military's move from a segregated to a totally integrated
force structure; (^) a leveling off of the transferability
of civilian and military skills; and (5) family need patterns
(e.g. PXs, hospitals, commissarys, housing, schools, and
dependent services) which tend to isolate the military
family from the civilian community
„
Another model can be represented which is called the
plural military which is both divergent (traditional) and
convergent in that it simultaneously projects organizational
trends both civilian and traditional in nature. For example,
a ground combat unit which is highly labor intensive will
probably be traditional. Highly technical support func-
tions (e.g. education, medical care, logistics, and mainte-




Clearly the institutionalization or normative approach
to organizational development in the military is not always
appropriate because values are different in the many sub-
elements o The OD practitioner's greatest contribution to
the military services could be in facilitating the new
organizational forms needed for the pluralistic model and
in helping develop personnel,' military justice and disci-
pline policies for the differing work ethos [Ref. 35>
p. 255-277].
In summary,
A military force uniformly moving toward more
recognition of individual rights and less rigid-
ity in social control would in all likelihood
seriously disaffect career personnel while making
military service only marginally more palatable to
its resistant members. A predominately tradi-
tional military, on the other hand, would most
likely be incapable of either maintaining the
organization at its required complexity or attrac-
ting the kind of membership necessary for effec-
tive performance. More ominous, a traditional
military in a rapidly changing society could
develop anti-civilian values tearing the basic
fabric of democratic ideology [Ref. 35> P« 278]
.
C. MILITARY HISTORY
While the bombardment was knocking the trench
to pieces at Fossalta, he lay very flat and
sweated and prayed, "Oh Jesus Christ get me out
of here. Dear Jesus, please get me out. Christ,
please, please, please, Christ, If you'll only
keep me from getting killed I'll do anything you
say. I believe in you and I'll tell everybody
in the world that you are the only thing that
matters
. Please, please, dear Jesus," The shel-
ling moved further up the line. We went to work
on the trench and in the morning the sun came up
and the day was hot and muggy and cheerful and
quiet. The next night back at Mestre he did not
tell the girl he went upstairs with at the Villa
Rossa about Jesus, And he never told anybody.
Ernest Hemingway [Ref. 19, p. 89]
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"The subject matter of military sociology is best defined
by reference to organized violence" [Ref, 26, p. 9], Mili-
tary history records how this organized violence is accom-
plished including the tactics, the strategy, the weapons,
and the weapons systems. But, "by its choice of focus,
automatically distorts perspective and too often dissolves
into sycophancy or hero-worship, culminating in the odd case
in a bizarre sort of identification by the author with his
subject" [Ref. 25, p. 2?].
This study of organizational development and its combat
applications uses military history as a base because speci-
al-
fie literature on combat applications of OD is limited.
Additionally, military history is used as an integral part
of this thesis because the dynamics of combat are suffi-
ciently different from the non-combat environment and "the
combat soldier
. . .
when committed to battle is hardly the
model of Max Weber's ideal bureaucrat following rigid rules
and regulations" [Ref. 2k f p. 113]- The central theme,
when attempting to draw a corollary between OD and military
history, is that human processes still exist regardless of
the type of situation. These human processes appear to be
much more critical in a combat environment because the suc-
cess of military operations and human lives are at stake.
4 The author found only two articles dealing specifically
with combat applications of OD. Charles Greenbaum, et al,
"The Military Psychologist During Wartime: A Model Based on
Action Research and Crisis Intervention" and Gavriel Soloman's
"Professional Dilemmas of the Psychologist in Organizational
Emergency" were articles written about the application of OD
during the Yom Kippur War of 1973.
29

S. L. A. Marshall and J. Glenn Gray are used as primary
sources of reference. Not only do they graphically depict
military history but, more importantly, the human processes
which underscore the crucial nature of the group and group
dynamics o These human aspects of combat are essestial
ingredients in military effectiveness. When the nature
of the battle, the tactics, the maps, and many other
tractitional aspects of military history are removed from
consideration, several recurrent themes emerge.
1 . Combat Creates Fear
Both he (Marshall) and du Picq believe that
an army is a genuine social organism, governed
by its own social laws, and that formal disci-
pline, imposed from above, is of limited utility
in getting men to fight . . soldiers must develop
a 'mutual acquaintanceship which establishes pride '--
sees the suppression of fear chiefly as the officer's
task . . . fear is general among men, but to observe
further that men are commonly loath that their fear
will be expressed in specific acts which their
comrades will recognize as cowardice. The major-
ity are unwilling to take extraordinary risks and
do not aspire to a hero's role, but they are equally
unwilling that they should be considered the lease
worthy among those present
. , , an army should
foster the closest acquaintance among its soldiers,
that it should seek to create groups of friends,
centered if possible on someone identified as a
'natural' fighter, since it is their 'mutual acquain-
tanceship* which will ensure no one flinches or
shirks. 'When a soldier is „ . . known to the men
who are around him, he . . . has reason to fear
losing the one thing he is likely to value more
highly than life—his reputation as a man among
other men* [Ref. 25, p. 72-73].
Besides the obvious fear of personal extinction, there
are strange fears associated with combat. Some of these
30

include the concern for sphincter control, what all of this
is doing to one's career chances and what may or may not
be happening to one's loved ones at home,, (Concern for
the latter may he much more quiescent in just a few minutes
after engagement with the enemy.)
2. A General Reluctance to Expend Firepower During Combat
S. L. A. Marshall reports that there has been some
improvement in the firepower expenditure rate for the
American soldier since World War II, most noteably in Korea
and Vietnam. However, less than one-fourth of the troops
actually fired their weapons in battle [Ref, 33* P= 15]
»
Toughened military leaders are shocked by this disparity.
3. Changes in Behavior of Individuals in a Combat Zone
There are many examples of this but perhaps the
best example is the Hemingway quote at the beginning of
this section. Another example is the sexual behavior of
men in combat which has persisted for centuries, The prin-
cipal sexual relationship is that of a conqueror to victim,
However, this type of relationship seldom continues judging
from the number of soldiers who return to the area of combat
to find their prostitute and take her home as their wife
[Ref. 17, p. 59-95].
k. The Feeling of Superiority Over the Enemy
The American soldiers' image of the enemy seems to
portray four somewhat conflicting basic characteristics:
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(a) That all military men are comrades in arms,
(b) That the enemy is a creature not human at all,
(c) That the enemy is a loathsome animal below a
human level and an enemy of God thus making killing him a
sacrificial act, and
(d) That the enemy is essentially a decent man who
is temporarily misguided [Ref. 17, p. 131-169] • This ste-
reotypical perception of the enemy has the potential for
creating many motivation problems for the military ser-
vices. For example, that which motivates a black soldier
to willingly kill a Viet Cong soldier might certainly be
different than motivating him to kill a black native in
Africa. The image of superiority over the enemy is no
longer true when one compares the overall strength, tech-
nology, and numbers of the Russian and Warsaw Pack countries
with the United States and NATO.
5. lack of Political Affiliation
. . . the composite picture leaves no doubt
that the American soldier had neither strong
beliefs about national war nor a highly developed
sense of personal committment to the war effort. . . ,
So it is again the primary group that is involved
in explaining effective military performance [Ref. 3^»
P- 7].
6. Group Cohesion as a Motivator
Defense of this theme is best described by 3 . L. A.
Marshall's statement that "I hold it to be one of the sim-
plest truths of war that the thing which enables an infantry
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soldier to keep going with his weapon is the near presence
or the presumed presence of a comrade" [Ref. 24
,
p. 94].
This theme is further defended by Charles Moskos' analysis
of the American soldier in Vietnam.
It (combat motivation) focuses attention
instead on the role of face-to-face or "primary"
groups, and explains the motivation of the indi-
vidual combat soldier as a function of his solidar-
ity and social intimacy with fellow soldiers at
small group levels . . . „ I argue that combat
motivation arises out of the linkages between
individuals self-concern, primary-group pro-
cesses, and the shared beliefs of soldiers
[Ref, 34, p. 135].
Another example of group cohesion in a combat environ-
ment concerns behavior while captured, Albert Biderman
defended the behavior of American POW's in the Korean War
by stressing that resistance was more a function of the
peer relationships that existed within the camps between
fellow prisoners than the orders, advice, and encouragement
of seniors in rank [Ref, 7]- This premise is further sup-
ported by CDR Phillip Butler and his experience as a North
Vietnamese POW for eight years, CDR Butler's experience
also indicated that the influence of seniors in terms of
rank was not the driving factor in regard to resistance
to giving information and other POW activities including
excruciating physical torture. What is most significant was
Information in support of this premise was obtained in
a personal interview with CDR Phillip Butler on 28 Jan 1978.
CDR Butler is a Human Resources Management Team Leader at
Human Resources Management Center, San Diego, California.
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the peer relationship among POW's—not leadership. POW's
apparently do not need a command structure as much as they
need a support group composed of peers.
D. CONTRIBUTIONS FROM ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
Military sociology presents some of the macro problems
facing society and the military establishment. Military
history usually confines the study of the military environ-
ment to a more micro level because it focuses on the internal
processes of the military and its unique mission of applying
violence in a legalistic and moralistic setting. Other
disciplines such as economics and psychology assist in
further describing the independent variables affecting the
all-volunteer force. These variables are presented here
because they seem to have an important affect on the orga-
nizational development effort of military OD practitioners
now and likely in the future as well.
Presently almost one-half of the defense budget is allo-
cated for pay to Z.k million active military personnel, 1.6
million retired military personnel, and 1 million civilian
white-and-blue collar workers. The defense manpower costs
for 1977 were 53 billion dollars. This payroll will pro-
bably continue to increase because of inflation and increased
competition for scarce manpower resources caused by the
ending of the draft and a steadily decreasing supply of
prime recruiting candidates. In fact, manpower costs are
projected to reach a minimum of 61 billion dollars by 1985
3^

assuming no inflation and authorized force manning levels
remain constant. In addition, the shortfall in available
manpower is predicted to be 88,000 personnel assuming low
unemployment and 53 > 000 personnel assuming high unemployment
[Ref. 9» p. xi-xxiii].
The options which can be considered by the Department
of Defense (D0D) to alleviate the scarce manpower situation
appear to be limited. The most promising relief can be
obtained by utilizing more women. The US Army presently
has almost 50,000 female soldiers. This figure will increase
to 50,^4-00 females in 1979. This total will constitute
7 percent of the total army forces. The goal is to increase
army strength to 81,000 females by 1983 which would mean
11 percent of the force would be comprised of females.
Given the projected manpower shortages in the future, it
would appear senseless to ignore the 300,000 females who
annually meet entrance requirements for military duty
[Ref. 8, p. 1^]. Future utilization of females is primarily
dependent upon changes in federal law governing the use of
females in combat positions. Currently, the civilian sector
and the military sector continue to have a protectionist
attitude toward females in combat roles.
This protectionist attitude might not be so appropriate
in todays military. Albert Biderman points out that ". .
the risks of personal danger in the military are no greater
than those in civilian life. In the military, the tasks
which are purely military continually recede as the
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institution becomes more and more technological and logisti-
cal" [Ref. 23, p. 15]. The protectionist attitude might
also be outdated because of a " , . . decline in the pro-
portion of the work force performing manual tasks.
Similarly, in the military sector, the proportion of per-
sonnel attached to ground combat and general duty military
occupations has also declined" [Ref. 18, p. 2]. Females
have adequately demonstrated not only the willingness but
also the capability to function in occupational positions
traditionally reserved for males because of a perceived
level of danger and physical differences [Ref. 8, p. Ik-"].
Another option being considered by military planners
and the House Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee is to
increase the number of first termers from 50 percent to
60 percent. This has been recommended because it would
save 2 billion dollars a year [Ref. 38, p. ^] . This recom-
mendation appears rather optimistic given the predicted man-
power shortages through 1985 and places an almost impossible
burden on military recruiters. As the population decreases
and unemployment decreases, as much as one-third of the
required supply of eligible males simply will not be avail-
able to meet military manpower requirements [Ref. 9, p. ^3-^5]
This situation, coupled with pressure to recruit quali-
fied personnel and pressure to decrease the attrition rate,
makes the job of the recruiter increasingly .more difficult.
There are approximately 18,000 military personnel involved
in recruiting and they appear to have saturated almost all
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population areas. The average cost to recruit an enlistee
in fiscal year 19?6 was $1,240. The marginal cost to
obtain each enlistee using the medium of additional
recruiters is expected to be $5,500 for 1978 [Ref. 9,
p. 43-45]. These factors lead to the conclusion that across-
the-board pay increases are not as effective as bonuses or
selective pay raises in attracting and retaining military
personnel [Ref. 18, p. 13]
•
Increasing the dependence on reserve forces is also an
option being considered to relieve some of the manpower
shortages for the active military. This alternative is
certainly worthy of consideration but these same manpower
shortages have plagued the reserve forces even more than
the active forces. "Surprisingly, however, the critical
problem is not recruitment, but retention" [Ref. 47, p, 14].
Recent reports indicate the reserve forces are 500,000
personnel short and the situation is getting increasingly
worse [Ref, 41, p. 46]
=
The ending of the draft has caused a continual decline
in reserve forces manning levels. This reserve segment of
our National Defense increasingly relies on prior service
personnel and has caused a top-heavy rank structure in
order to meet minimum requirements. This rank imbalance,
in turn, causes more expensive manpower costs and acts as
an additional constraint in the efforts to stabilize
manpower costs [Ref. 3]- Any increased recruiting for
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Reserve Forces will, therefore, likely only intensify the
competition between active and reserve military and the
civilian sector for the same pool of resources.
Other economic considerations are beginning to impact
on military manpower issues. The economic issue concerning
the efficient distribution of labor and capital has received
much attention and several economists have substantiated
the fact that the military should accelerate the substitu-
tion of capital for labor. The United States has reversed
the trend of the last decade and is progressing from a
labor intensive environment to a capital intensive environ-
ment [Refo 11].
The predominant motivation for this substitution trend
is inflation and increasing manpower costs in our society,
For the military, it simply means that it is cheaper to
develop highly sophisticated and technical weapons and
weapon support systems rather than use large quantities of
people [Refo 11] , High quality personnel are required to
operate and maintain the weapon systems. These high quality
personnel (mental category I, II, and III) are the very ones
that the military is having the greatest difficulty attrac-
ting and retaining.
Perhaps the region of greatest impact on those military
forces which heavily depend on sophisticated weapons is in
the field of training. Presently at any given time approxi-
mately 18 percent of active duty military personnel are
involved in training [Ref, 9, p. 8], Any savings in this
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area would obviously benefit the taxpayer. However this
savings would accrue due to budgetary considerations only.
Probably few people could argue the fact that the greater
the technology, the greater the degree of specialization,
and the greater the amount of training required to effec-
tively use the technology which is available. Efforts
to reduce training time, training personnel, and training
overhead will become increasingly difficult assuming the
military continues to replace obsolete weapons with more
technically sophisticated and complex weapons.
Technological implications have already surfaced in
several areas in this paper. The technology issue would
not be complete without making some inferences to its effect
in combat. Two general themes should be considered and
represent polar extremes. First, technology has allowed the
development of weapons that vary from small target destruc-
tion without even seeing the target to vast destruction
encompassing literally hundreds of square miles. Secondly,
no matter what the level of technology, individuals (tradi-
tionally ground combat forces) are required to occupy and
defend the objective land areas. From the perspective of
a ground combatant, it seems logical to assume that, even
though the relative distance between combatants is increasing,
the destructiveness and accuracy of weapons make the pro-
bability of death seemingly more imminent by comparison
with past wars. This destruction-at-a-distance appears to
be the purpose of the new weapons which are being introduced
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into our military arsenals. The real question is, "Can
this probability of death become so great that military
personnel and prospective military personnel would resort
to any means to avoid military service?"
There seems to be, in short, a wide area of combat
variables which have thus far eluded understanding and
description by classical military theorists , The inter-
action and modification of many of these variables is
seen as a viable challenge to the field of organizational
development.
E. ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT
Organization development is an effort (1)
planned, (2) organization-wide, and (3) managed
from the top, to (^) increase organizational
effectiveness and health through (5) planned
interventions in the organization's "processes,"
using behavioral-science knowledge [Ref. 6, p. 9]«
Within the framework of this definition of organization
development some rather significant problems become readily
apparent when conducting an analysis of OD in a military
environment and specifically a combat environment. First,
the OD effort is planned, organization wide. This presents
a basic management problem because of the immense size of
the total organization. In the US Army, the total organi-
zation involves approximately 800,000 personnel and the
several hundred thousand Department of the Army civilians.
Secondly, the emphasis on management from the top is cer-
tainly apparent for the US Army [Ref. 39].
^0

One major problem is that there are many organizational
levels between the Chief of Staff and the soldiers and
civilians who could benefit most from an OD effort, Pro-
gress is being made in many Army units toward acceptance of
OD. It appears, however, that 275 trained consultants are
not likely to be sufficient to insure every active army
unit will benefit from the Organizational Effectiveness
Program [Ref. 4],
Lastly, the utilization of behavioral-science knowledge
presents some programmatic risks because the Army's Orga-
nization Effectiveness Staff Officer is trained "in a 16
week intensive and experiential based program at the OE
Training Center" [Ref. 40, p. 4]. While this training
program is intensive and comprehensive, the varying back-
ground of students does not compare favorably with the
generally higher academic credentials and experience levels
of most professional civilian OD consultants.
Organization development as practiced today involves
numerous approaches and techniques aimed at the individual,
team, intergroup, or total organization [Ref. 45]. The
typical organizational processes the US Army is trying to
improve through developmental efforts are communications,
problem solving, coordination, decision making, goal setting,
and planning. These processes are key elements in achieving
combat readiness and mission accomplishment [Ref. 40, p, 10].
These largely human processes are consistent with OD efforts
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in the civilian sector whose goals are often improved pro-
fitability, productivity, and services to stockholders,
owners, and the general publico
The US Army's Organizational Effectiveness program is
an attempt to incorporate within its own military framework
the potential benefits of organization development. These
benefits have been widely established in the civilian
world. There are many similarities with both OD programs
in a very broad sense. These similarities appear to exist
largely because the Army is not currently involved in a
war or similar type of police action. This peacetime setting
allows the Organization Effectiveness Staff Officer (OESO)
to conduct interventions in a rather static garrison
environment.
Perhaps, the closest correlation to a more dynamic
combat environment would be when the OESO has worked with
units during field training exercises and command post
exercises. Unfortunately, the reality is that these exer-
cises are not combat. An enemy is not shooting live ammu-
nition with intent to kill. No matter how realistic the
training situation, the individual and organizational stress
are not likely to be the same.
The subject of stress has gained increasing attention
in the practice and writings of the field of organization
development,, Individual stress has traditionally been
treated as a medical problem but the origination of stress
is often found in the work setting in the form of role
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ambiguity and interpersonal and intergroup conflicts.
Thus, controlling stress in the work setting has "been an
increasingly important subject for OD practitioners. The
identification of stress and its effect can often be mea-
sured or identified by the type of behavior a person exhibits
Some characteristics of healthy behavior include:
(1) If you never suffer from a sense of urgency.
(2) If you harbor no free-floating hostility
nor display or discuss your achievements.
(3) If you play for fun and relaxation or exhibit
your superiority at any time.
(^) If you relax without guilt, just as you can
work without agitation,
(5) Aware of your capabilities not^-what peers
and superiors think [Ref. 12].
Combat operations would probably cause most individuals
involved to exhibit the characteristics of behavior which
are diametrically opposite to those listed above. The most
useful role of a OESO in this pressure filled situation
would be to minimize the effects of stress. The OESO should
encourage, as rapidly as possible, the return of organiza-
tional members to more healthy behavior.
Another ramification of stress concerns the quality of
decisions made under simulated combat conditions. In a
For a more detailed description of Type A and Type B
behavior see Friedman, M., and Rosenman, R„, Type A
Behavior and Your Heart , Alfred Knopf, New York, 197^.
Additional sources of information on stress can be found
in Seyle, H., Stress Without Distress , Lippincott, New
York 19?4; Adams, J., et al., Transitions , Allanheld, Osmun
and Co., Montclair, New Jersey, 1976; and Adams, J.,




test conducted at Ft, Benning, Georgia, the essential com-
ponents of a battalion (commander, staff, and four company
commanders) were exposed to varying degrees of combat-like
stress. Stress intensity was controlled through the fre-
quency and urgency of message inputs to organizational
leaders affecting their units under simulated combat con-
ditions o
The test results indicate that the quality of decision
under medium stress was significantly less than the quality
of decisions made under low and high stress [Ref. 36] •
Possible alternatives for OESOs and other OD practitioners
are to decrease the stress where health is an issue but
increase the stress above the medium level when the pace of
combat does not allow it to be lowered. Based upon the data
generated by this study, under managed stress, the quality of
the decision, mission accomplishment, and minimizing losses
would likely be enhanced.
A basic model underlying most organization
development activities is the action research
model--a data-based, problem-solving model that
replicates the steps involved in the scientific
method inquiry. Three processes are involved
in action research: data collection, feedback
of the data to the clients, and action planning
based on the data. Action research is both an
approach to problem solving--a model or a paradigm,
and a problem-solving process--a series of acti-
vities and events [Ref. 15, p. 84-].
A critical question is whether the OESO or other military
OD practitioners will have the luxury of trying to accom-
plish data collection, feedback, and action planning under
combat conditions. OD efforts undertaken in the Yom Kippur
War of 1973 indicate that:

The common OD assumptions cannot be met, and
change cannot he expected to he durable which,
as Seashore and Bowers (1963) imply, would
make the psychologist's effort "futile."
Indeed, we maintain that common OD is futile
as far as organizational emergency is con-
cerned. However, the psychologist can serve
a vital function in helping the organization
cope with emergency, provided that the orien-
tation, contents, processes, work methods,
and outcome criteria are changed [Ref, 5» p. 7]
•
There is an opposing view to the usefulness of OD con-
sultants in combat, which again, is based on experience
during the Yom Kippur War. "The basic supposition. . .
is that social-psychological intervention in wartime must
be based on organization development, action research, and
crisis intervention" [Ref. 16, p, 8]. Greenbaum et al do
concede that the most important function of the OD con-
sultant is before and after battle, "Except for unusual
circumstances, the professional role of the psychologist
during actual battle is very limited" [Ref. 16, p. 15-16].
In addition to the benefits of OD during the Yom Kippur
War, many other incidents have occurred which highlight
the potential benefits of OD in combat and other stressful
conditions. A classic example is the US Marine unit
n
called Carlson's Raiders. The combat achievements of
7
' This is supposedly a factual experience but the
author could find no written reference to Carlson's
Raiders in any publications.
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this unit are unparalled in terms of combat successes
while losing so few marines. The successes of this unit
are reputed to be a function of (1) participative planning
processes for combat, (2) extensive team building and
training, (3) strong group identity and cohesion, (4)
first name relationships among both officers and enlisted
men, and (5) immediate de-briefings after combat to process
the lessons learned and analysis for future operations.
Ironically, this unit was reportedly disbanded because its
methods were far too radical for the traditional marine
image
.
Another example, somewhat out of the context of OD, is
the Cuban Missile Crisis , Graham Allison [Ref. 2] presents
a very detailed analysis of the personalities and events
which represent one of this civilization's closest encounters
with a nuclear holocaust. President Kennedy's leadership
during this crisis proved to be correct in spite of an
earlier failure in an encounter with the Cuban government
during the Bay of Pigs invasion.
Irving Janis [Ref. 21] explains some of the basic rea-
sons why the Cuban Missile Crisis was a success while the
Bay of Pigs invasion was not. During the Bay of Pigs,
President Kennedy's leadership was seen as everpresent
and domineering. This overweaning leadership apparently
resulted in the lack of critical thinking to the extent
that experts did not offer their recommendations and a
wrong decision was made.
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The Cuban Missile Crisis is an excellent contrast where
utilization of some of the "basic tenets of OD was obvious.
First, the President's role was passive in the decision
making process and all of the members of the executive
committee were allowed to process all information without
being inhibited. The results were the correct decisions
were made and nuclear war was prevented.
The military services have used organization development
to help create a level of readiness in a static garrison
atmosphere . However,- the level of readiness is a complex
measure consisting of both the availability and operability
of equipment as well as the optimum number of personnel
with the required rank and skills to accomplish their combat
mission,, The skills needed to accomplish the mission are
a function of both the training received and the management
of the personnel in the training environment, The deploy-
ment of combat ready units to a combat zone, typically means
that the units so employed have the capability to perform
as trained--it does not necessarily mean that the units
will actually perform as trained. The following model
(Figure 1) is a graphic representation of the levels of
readiness and effectiveness and the broad categories of
variables affecting the levels,
The transition from a force in readiness to one that
achieves final combat effectiveness is often a difficult
movement. The ready force must move through an apparent
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values. Clearly the probability of death (to self and/or
others) creates questions and conflict distinctly different
from that characteristic of the garrison stance. Lack of
popular support, little or no political affiliation, changing
social attitudes toward responsibility to serve, death,
and other issues will likely be surfaced when combat is
inevitable.
The key point in this model (Figure 1) is that OD has
been used to help develop desired levels of combat readi-
ness . This development has been accomplished through pro-
cess. The process or the way things get done is distin-
guished from the task or what things get done. This focus
on process is an essential element OD practitioners have
used both to improve the organization and to improve the
individuals that comprise the organization. This same
process emphasis is viewed as an essential ingredient of
final combat effectiveness . It appears that OESOs should
be prepared to continue to assist units in utilizing this
process function.
Further examples can best be presented by asking what
the probable result of military operations would have been
if an OD consultant had surfaced those sensitive process
issues which always seem to hinder military missions.
S. L. A. Marshall's writings in Vietnam frequently point
out the personality conflicts between commanders, support
elements, and between soldiers within the same unit
Perhaps, just a few minutes of process, correctly done,
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might have prevented the loss of life and. insured better
accomplishment of those unpleasant missions. The inter-
action of the major services in ad hoc, new staff organi-
zations such as MACV might have profited from skilled




III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
When the US Army undertook opinion surveys to
facilitate planning for the volunteer force,
results underlined the obvious conclusion that
meaningful work was a very important element of
satisfaction for enlisted personnel [Ref. 23,
p. 20].
Virtually all of the military services have advertising
programs using all types of media to attract potential
applicants. Military recruiters have now saturated almost
all geographical areas to the point they are in intense
competition with each other. Unfortunately, these adver-
tising messages and recruiters efforts apparently cannot
compete with the impact of derogatory statements being made
by family members, peer groups, and personnel recently dis-
charged from the military. One of the primary reasons
".
. .is that young men who are not disposed to join the
services come from homes that hold the military in rather
low esteem. They cite low status, low prestige of military
education, family separation, danger and the bad experiences
fathers had in the service" [Ref. ^-1, p. 3^1 • If these
personal messages convey a negative picture of the military,
it is likely that no amount of advertising or recruiter
effort will effectively change the perception of military




American society at large appears to have concluded that
military service is no longer a mandated individual respon-
sibility. Thus it is a perfectly acceptable course of
action for young people not to serve the military in any
capacity. Historically, serving in the military services
during times of national emergency and war has been both a
desirable and expected duty. However, any controversial
military intervention remotely resembling the Korean War
or military actions similar to Vietnam would probably revive
the anti-military sentiment which was so prevalent during
the late 1960's and early 19?0's.
B, THE IDEAL SETTING
For purposes of discussion, an ideal military setting is
defined as one in which: (1) Military service is considered
by the populace to be at least passively acceptable and
desirable, (2) The required quantity and quality of mili-
tary personnel are available to meet the current manning
levels. (3) The management and leadership styles of service
members have evolved over a period of time which is, for
comparative purposes, essentially representative of society
in general. (^) The predominant climate within all mili-
tary organizations is one where all personnel have the




This list of factors of course, represents an ideal
organization. Characteristically, this organization would
"be considered healthy "by organizational theorists because
it is proactive, has well understood and clearly defined
missions, and individuals at all levels feel they are
making a meaningful contribution to planning, training, and
implementation of all activities „ This idealized situation
represents the available potential for developing orga-
nizations in accordance with the programs presently being
instituted under the tenets of Organizational Development.
Presently, there are no known wars or other hostile
activities in which US servicemen are actively involved,
Let's assume the ideal unit having characteristics described
above was taken out of its relatively sterile environment
and suddenly placed in a combat role. By its very nature,
combat causes the intensity of activities and individual
feelings to change
.
At a minimum, feelings of self-preservation, as fre-
quently noted in the writings of S. L. A. Marshall, would
probably take precedence over organizational preservation.,
Other traditional responses to a combat environment might
include: (1) a perceived lack of assistance from support
elements, e.g. air support, artillery fire, and logistics;
and (2) a feeling of being unfairly treated because the
majority of the people involved are support oriented and
do not suffer the agony of being shot at or closely engaged
with the enemy. While this intergroup conflict may be
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considered a severe limitation for all the forces involved
in combat operations, it is also an asset in developing
group cohesion at lower levels within an organization.
These conflicts have obvious consequences for commanders
at all levels involved. The probability is very high that
the superiors will resort to a traditional autocratic
leadership style that has proven effective in the past.
Notably, this style is diametrically opposite of the situ-
ation we have described as being ideal.
Table 2 presents some of the organizational effectiveness
problems and the activities or techniques which should help
maintain minimum levels of effectiveness for military units
at various levels under combat conditions,
C. THE BASIC PROBLEM
If we could gain only a modicum of greater
wisdom concerning what manner of men we are,
what effect might it not have on future events
[Ref. I?, p. 24].
"Let ' s-focus-on-what-you-can-do-in-your-own-organization"
is a frequenly used expression for organization development
consultants [Ref, 14, p. l]. This does put the problem in
the "here and now" and focuses on those things internal to
an organization. In a combat environment, the issue might
very well be "I don't want to kill someone because that is
the way I was raised," Communication, team building, and
many other OD techniques are useless when the primary life
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OD in the military is a massive attempt to institution-
alize change. This change is virtually impossible in a
short period of time. Social change usually involves a
process of socialization and it is thankfully, often
painfully slow. Perhaps it should be slow because the
slower the process, the more quickly the change can be
reacted to and reversed if the trend is incorrect. One
test of social change is whether it can be measured in an
individual's behavior. To quantify these changes in orga-
nizational functioning, is what OD consultants attempt to
use to justify their existence. If the needed change is
environmental or external, why try to deal with it if one
cannot change it. If one cannot change the environment,
perhaps the change effort should be centered around creating
an internal understanding of the difficulty and try to
develop a capability to live with the constraint rather
than wasting valuable energy in the form of resistance.
This leads us to the basic problems of applying orga-
nization development in a combat environment. First, our
normative models of OD might not be appropriate to contri-
bute to the success of military operations, Secondly, OD
consultants can not be sure what the real issues are.
Therefore, they should be prepared to deal with the problems
of death, combat, separation, and casualties before, during,
and after battle. Thirdly, the ideal organization that
has been developed in the sterile, garrison environment
may not be able to function as it ideally should. It is
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likely that the dynamics of combat and a change to a more
autocratic leadership style will have caused the unit to
develop a different personality.
What was once a bureaucratic element in an impersonal
organization can now be a cohesive, virile entity, thrust
into a terrifying and dehumanizing environment. The acid
test is whether or not this new unit with new ways of
communicating, motivating, and deciding its direction can
operate effectively in combat . Simply stated: Why should
the US military implement OD programs if they will not be
used in a combat environment? Finally, consultant efforts
are centered around group processes when in fact "a man
under pressure, particularly an emergent leader, can use
advice" [Ref. 30, p. 16^].
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSION
The underlying problem of using organization develop-
ment in combat stems from the assumption of some influential
military decision makers that OD should be but probably
will not be used in combato If past history is a guide, the
strong tendency will be for commanders to regress to the
more traditional methods of leadership that were successful
during World War II, the Korean War, and to a more question-
able extent, the war in Vietnam.
B. ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS
The final combat effectiveness issue and the utilization
of OESOs in combat can present several different strategies
or alternatives. { Three possible strategies have been
identified that represent a continuum from non-use to full
use of the OESO in combat.
1. The Decision Not to Use OD Principles or OESOs in
Combat
OD has never been used, in a literal sense, to sup-
port combat operations for the US Armed Forces , Many vet-
eran commanders would probably argue that because OD has
never been tested and proven in combat, it should not be
used at all. Combat is characteristically an activity
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requiring quick decisive action. The participative,
collaborative management and leadership styles would likely
be seen as inconsistent with the demands of the combat
situation. The potential danger is the force in readiness
which was created in the relatively static garrison environ-
ment may not function as well in the combat setting. This
strategy includes using the OESO as an additional manpower
resource in his/her warfare speciality as an impending
combat situation is forecasted. The gains might include
speedier decisions with less concern as to whether the
organization is functioning well. The cost might include
lower quality decisions and considerable organizational waste
which would go unchecked and unnoticed.
2. The Decision To Use OP And OESOs But Abandon The
Effort Should It Prove Ineffective or Dysfunctional
Again, the use of OD and OESOs have not been tested
in combat and the reaction to OD and OESOs is currently
unknown. In this alternative, planning for use of OD and
OESOs in combat is based on the criterion of demonstrated
effectiveness. First, continue to use OD if it is effective,
and secondly, abandon OD should it become ineffective.
This alternative might lead to two divergent conclusions.
However, it is consistent with current contingency views
of organizations and management [Ref. 20] , The move from
a force in readiness to final combat effectiveness may
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compare with a transition from prototype production to mass
production in the civilian world. Empirical evidence
indicates that "mass production was more successful with
classical design, whereas unit and process production were
more successful when they used humanistic designs" [Ref . 20,
p. ^4-25] o The transition also indicates changes from a
stable to a dynamic environment.
Q
They (Lawrence and Lorsch) showed that in cer-
tain stable environments the classical forms
tend to be more effective. In changing environ-
ments the opposite is true. More humanistic
forms are required to permit organizations to
respond effectively to their unstable environ-
ments [Ref. 20, p. Jj-26],
One important dilemma for the 0ES0 is how to facilitate
the change in leadership styles from classical to humanistic
and vice versa. Another important dilemma for OESOs is
recognizing when traditional styles of leadership would
compliment the organization's mission and also when more
' humanistic styles of leadership are more appropriate.
3. Demand That 0D Principles and OESOs be Used in Combat
This is the alternative that is advocated in this
thesis. 0D has been successfully used in a military setting
for a number of years now and 0D technology has developed
Q
See Lawrence, P., and Lorsch, J., Organization and
Environment
,
Irwin, Homewood, Illinois, 1969 i
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sufficient maturity to indicate its probable success in
combat o The organizational issues will be somewhat differ-
ent and likely require greater urgency but the process is
the same--namely that the group dynamics, cohesion, and
intergroup understanding are as important as the group
task in combat. The evidence is overwhelming. Group cohe-
sion musters firepower.
C. HOW OESOs MIGHT BE USED IN COMBAT
The OESOs primary use in combat should be as a partici-
pant observer. The dynamics of the situation do not allow
adequate time for extensive involvement with combat units
or subgroups within combat units. The role of participant
observer would be maximized when the OESO is sufficiently
removed from the situation to retain some semblance of
outside objectivity. He should 3 however, remain close
enough to be credible. He should use his knowledge of
organizational systems to inform commanders and make
recommendations on how the status of interpersonal relation-
ships within organizations are affecting the combat mission.
The role of participant observer will likely be extremely
critical during the initial stages of deployment and during
the first combat operation. The nature of the combat
situation will probably be established during the first
engagements. Proper processing of this combat status infor-
mation and the analysis of its effect on soldiers can be




Use of the OESO as a participant observer should not be
limited only to actual combat operations. The US military-
is frequently used to assist the civilian population in
natural disasters and other emergencies such as riots. The
OESO should have unlimited freedom to involve himself in any
phase of the emergency situation. The purpose of this
mobility is not primarily intelligence gathering. The OESO
may best serve by using his knowledge of organizational
systems and data gathering abilities to make recommendations
on how to most appropriately employ military units and the
level of restraint which is most consistent v/ith the
situation.
Historical examples are abundant. One relevant question
is related to the eventual outcome of the Kent State inci-
dent. It possibly could have been avoided if a participant
observer (OESO) had been involved in the crucial decision
making processes. These decisions concerned a determination
of the most effective civil disturbance tactics to be
employed and the policy for the use of live ammunition.
The treatment of POW's is also a potential issue in
which an OESO may be effective. This treatment question is
particularly important during the initial stages of hostili-
ties. If proper and humane treatment of POW's become a
norm during the initial stages of combat, perhaps the
communist treatment of American POW's during Korea and Vietnam
would have been different. The OESO may also be effective
in dealing with the POW issue beyond simply a front line
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rationale. He may be able to help with representing to
decision markers the organizational and. political benefits
of fair treatment upon which may hinge the nation's world-
wide reputation.
Civil-military relations are not only important in the
United States and other host countries where US forces are
engaged in combat. The interactions of US military forces
with the local populace and displaced refugees will likely
be the single most important factor in creating local (host
country) support of combat operations. The OESO could be
instrumental in removing the stereotypical "GOOK" or dumb
foreigner image. This would involve a role of explaining
to friendly troops the cultural differences between American
society and those of the other countries involved in the
conflict. The ultimate goal of this work is not to force
American standards on other countries but to create a level
of acceptance of other cultures which ultimately compliments
q
the joint war effort.
The breakout of hostilities traditionally involves the
activation of new military units, The OESO can serve a
useful purpose in developing organizations and shortening
the time required for groups to establish effective working
relationships. New units would also benefit if the OESO
was recently returned from combat and had first hand
Q
A more detailed analysis of civil-military relations
can be found in Lovell, J., and Kronenberg, P., New Civil -
Military Relations
,




knowledge of organizational processes which are best suited
for supporting the war effort.
One very telling characteristic of units involved in
combat or other emergency operations is the tendency to
ignore the requirements for routine, unimportant reports
that do not support the combat mission. Combat usually
creates an elite sub-culture within the military units
involved (Gemeinschaf t) which is apparently inconsistent
with the more bureaucratic processes (Gesellschaft) of the
entire military community [Ref. ^3, p. 5^-62]. The OESO
can be effective in explaining the nature of .the breakdown
and helping to develop alternate means of obtaining the
desired information. Perhaps, simply creating some under-
standing of the need for Gemeinschaft in combat units could
.contribute toward reducing dysfunctional resistance between
supported and supporting activities.
Frequently in combat a phenomenon of fighting breaks
out in R&R centers in the rear areas. Gemeinschaft units
rebel against the apparent aloofness of Gesellschaft
environments. An OESO might well explain to Gesellschaft
commanders who are prepared to court-martial the more
cohesive brawlers just what is really taking place. It
is not inconsequential that someone should moderate
bureaucratic demands such as keeping computer card reports
dry during a monsoon or that someone should re-route the
beer truck to visit the front line units before scattering
its cargo to the supporting units. Nor is it inconsequential
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that little effort is spent on making clear the mission of
the support units. An OESO would not lack an agenda upon
which to work.
Units in need of personnel replacements also exhibit
characteristics of Gemeinschaft behavior. The personnel
support system usually requires extensive documentation.
This documentation is perceived by Gemeinschaft commanders
as catering to the Gesellschaft activities who control the
personnel support system. Commanders of Gemeinschaft units
resist the formal, official, written documentation because
it does not contribute to the combat mission. Unfortunately,
the results are replacements are not expeditiously assigned
to units and the necessary group processes are not ade-
quately accomplished prior to new combat operations.
The OESO will also be confronted with moral-ethical
problems. Under non- combat conditions, the OESO primarily
is trained in using a "truth, goodness, and light" philoso-
phy that involves absolute confidentiality within organi-
zations. Under combat conditions, he will probably be'
forced to disclose information to activities outside the
client organization. One illustration is the disclosure
of confidential information that can manifest itself in
the form of recommendations for relief from command when
incompetency, fatigue, stress, and other factors render a
commander ineffective. Unfortunately, this practice might




Further listings and examples of using OESOs in combat
operations are numerous. Whether the examples involve
"hack home" support, on the battlefield, or in a field
hospital, the message is simply that the potential benefits
of using OD and OESOs in combat appear to far outweigh
the risks,
Ec RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
There are numerous field training exercises and command
post exercises conducted each year in the United States
and in foreign countries where US servicemen are stationed,
These exercises represent as closely as possible the dyna-
mics of combat with the aid of devices and activities pro-
viding a great deal of realism. This thesis recommends
an extensive evaluation of the results of these exercises
under two approaches. First, evaluate units who have not
had the benefit of OD and secondly, evaluate units who
have had extensive training in OD and who go into the exer-
cises with OESOs working as OESOs. The hypothesis to be
tested is that units who use OD and OESOs will have better
morale, better performance records, and better intergroup
and intragroup processes which contribute to mission
accomplishment with minimum loss of lives than similar
units which have not.
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It is the author's view that the issue of the use of
the OESO resource in combat is of sufficient importance so
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